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The lack of progress in global climate change negotiations has spurred scholars to examine workable, subglobal policies to reduce anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
The late Elinor Ostrom led the way in a report she authored in 
2009 for the World Bank, calling for a more ‘polycentric’ approach 
to climate governance1. Others soon followed suit2–9. Whether refer-
ring to ‘polycentric approaches’, ‘building blocks’, ‘regime complexes’ 
or ‘bottom-up systems’, these authors all agree about the need to pay 
more attention to existing and potential subglobal climate policies 
that might, alone or in some combination, substitute for or supple-
ment the existing United Nations (UN) regime and/or provide new 
impetus to global negotiations. No one has yet offered a sufficient set 
of reasons for believing that a polycentric approach might produce 
a better climate outcome. This Perspective attempts to fill that gap.
Some scholars seem to have embraced polycentric solutions to 
climate change almost in desperation because of the lack of pro-
gress in global negotiations, but others have long preferred it as a 
matter of theory. Victor and Raustiala10 argued in favour of “regime 
complexes” — defined as collective[s] of partially overlapping and 
non-hierarchical regimes — over monocentric international legal 
systems for plant genetic resources several years before Keohane 
and Victor3 made similar arguments about climate policy. Abbott11, 
citing Ostrom12,13, specifically referenced the pre-existing literature 
on polycentric governance of common-pool resources.
The polycentric approach to policy
Ostrom’s1,13 own approach to climate governance was deeply rooted 
in the polycentric approach that was pioneered by her husband 
Vincent14, and that became a central pillar of the ‘Bloomington 
School’ of political economy15. Ostrom et al.14 based the polycen-
tric approach on a principle of subsidiarity according to which 
government services are best provided at the lowest level of gov-
ernment consistent with their effective application. A polycentric 
system is characterized by “the concurrence of multiple opportu-
nities by which participants can forge or dissolve links among dif-
ferent collective entities... [P]articipants must be able to pick and 
choose those producers and providers that are most appropriate to 
each specific issue at hand”16. Instead of a ‘monocentric hierarchy’, 
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where governmental units at higher levels make all collective-choice 
decisions, and units at lower levels simply follow commands from 
above, “a polycentric system is one in which governmental units 
both compete and cooperate, interact and learn from one another, 
and responsibilities at different governmental levels are tailored to 
match the scale of the public services they provide”1,4.
The ‘Bloomington School’ is associated with the Ostrom 
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana 
University. Throughout its 45-year history, the Ostroms and their 
Workshop colleagues developed theories and conducted empirical 
tests of collective action for resolving social and combined social–
ecological problems based in large part on the theory of polycen-
tric governance. Years before she became famous as a scholar of 
‘the commons’, Ostrom and her colleagues were designing and car-
rying out studies comparing ‘small’ (presumptively fragmented) 
and ‘large’ (consolidated and presumptively more efficient) police 
departments in Indianapolis and other cities. Those studies dem-
onstrated that large-scale, consolidated police departments do not 
always benefit from economies of scale and often suffer perfor-
mance deficiencies compared with smaller policing units in met-
ropolitan areas. These police studies informed Ostrom’s subsequent 
work on natural common-pool resources, ranging from small for-
ests to large irrigation systems, where the polycentric approach was 
found to have substantial utility1,12. Although much of her work on 
common-pool resources focused on local resource-management 
problems, Keohane and Ostrom17 explored how the polycentric 
approach to governance might also successfully operate at the inter-
national level.
When Ostrom later turned her attention to the problem of climate 
change1,13, she summarized the findings of her earlier applications of 
the polycentric approach to problems of providing public goods (for 
example, police services) and conserving common-pool resources. 
A key factor running through several of those findings was that the 
polycentric approach provides “greater opportunity for experimenta-
tion, choice, and learning” across levels of social organization4. She 
also referenced its tendency to “enhance innovation, learning, adap-
tation, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the 
achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes 
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at multiple scales…”13. These conclusions are well established in the 
‘Bloomington School’ literature, but Ostrom’s explanation was incom-
plete. She never fully explained how the polycentric approach could 
improve climate outcomes by (1) creating more opportunities for 
experiments and learning, and (2) building the mutual trust neces-
sary for improved climate outcomes. Because much already has been 
written about experimentation and learning in climate policy1,13,18, the 
emphasis here is on the widely neglected issue of trust-building.
Experimentation and learning in climate policy
No one believes that the UN’s global climate policy has been success-
ful. Yet it seems remarkably resistant to change, let alone replacement. 
But it has never been “the only game in town”19. Several authors point 
to numerous climate policies that have been, and are being, imple-
mented at local, state, regional and national governments, and even 
among private business associations1,2,4. These polycentric policies 
multiply opportunities for communication, trust-building, policy 
experimentation and learning. 
Local-level governments have been experimenting with GHG 
mitigation policies for many years now, and paying close attention to 
what others have been doing. Ostrom13 writes about a 2005 confer-
ence in London attended by representatives of 18 large cities. They 
compared notes on urban mitigation policies and reviewed the con-
gestion tax introduced by the City of London in 2003. Non-exempt 
motor vehicles entering London’s ‘Congestion Charge Zone’ must pay 
₤11.50 each working day. The primary purpose of the tax is to reduce 
city traffic and raise funds for London’s public transportation system. 
To the extent that the congestion charge moves more commuters 
from private to public transport, it also reduces carbon emissions. 
Virtually all major cities have been watching London’s experiment, 
and several, including Stockholm20 and Milan21, have already repli-
cated it. In 2007, when Mayor Michael Bloomberg proposed a conges-
tion charge for New York City, it was blocked in the state legislature 
despite widespread support22.
Elinor Ostrom1 observed that “all policies adopted at any scale 
can generate errors, but that without trial and error, learning can-
not occur.” If the Kyoto Protocol were in fact ‘the only game in town’, 
the extent of learning, and prospects for improving policies, would 
be quite narrow. A polycentric system of climate policies necessarily 
entails a greater number of discrete policy experiments from which 
policymakers at various levels of governance might learn valuable les-
sons, including about designing monitoring systems to ensure policy 
compliance1. The growing literature on experimentalist governance, 
including at the global level, supports Ostrom’s arguments18,23,24.
Relatedly, Ostrom1 observed that efforts “to improve levels of col-
lective action to overcome social dilemmas must enhance the level 
of trust of participants that others are complying with the policy or 
else many will seek ways of avoiding compliance.” And she noted 
that “[i]f the only policy related to climate change was adopted at the 
global scale, it would be particularly difficult to increase the trust that 
citizens and firms need to have that other citizens and firms located 
halfway around the globe”1 are reciprocating.
Building mutual trust through a polycentric approach
Trust has been absent in the global-level climate negotiations, which 
Scott Barrett25 has aptly described as a “free-rider game”. Formal and 
highly structured meetings involving thousands of individuals—the 
United Kingdom’s official delegation to the most recent meeting of 
the parties in Warsaw reportedly26 numbered 45—may not always 
provide the best fora for facilitating communications that lead to 
trust-building and cooperation. Trust is not the same as blind faith, 
where parties simply sit down and ‘do the right things’ according to 
someone’s moral compass. Rather, trust is earned by mutual commit-
ments that are not overly costly to monitor27. Thus, Ronald Reagan’s 
famous admonition to “trust, but verify” is redundant. Verifiability is 
part and parcel of trust.
One hypothesis of the polycentric approach to climate policy 
is that social–ecological problems can be successfully resolved, 
whether those problems are conceived as iterated Prisoners’ 
Dilemmas28,29 or Assurance games30–32, only if mutual trust among 
resource users can be cultivated over time through communica-
tion and cooperation across a range of issues. This hypothesis is 
consistent with Keohane’s33 observation that “Intergovernmental 
relationships… characterized by ongoing communication among 
working-level officials, ‘unauthorized’ as well as authorized, are 
inherently more conducive to information-exchange and agree-
ments than are traditional relationships between internally coherent 
bureaucracies that effectively control their communications with 
the external world.”
The diagram in Fig. 1, adapted from Ostrom34,35, describes rela-
tions between communication, trust and cooperation in repeated 
social dilemmas. Similar to Sen’s30 Assurance games, she locates “the 
core of a behavioural explanation” for mutual cooperation on social 
dilemmas in the trust individuals place in others, the investment 
those others make in developing and maintaining reputations for 
trustworthiness, and the probability that participants adopt norms 
of reciprocity (such as tit-for-tat strategies)35. If initial levels of coop-
eration are sufficiently high, then individuals learn to trust one 
another, developing new, or reinforcing existing, norms of reciproc-
ity and establishing reputations for trustworthiness that may lead to 
higher levels of cooperation in future interactions. This dynamic, 
reinforcing aspect of the cycle is not entirely clear in Ostrom’s origi-
nal depiction of these ‘core relationships’. My own contribution is to 
make manifest the dynamic process of trust-reinforcement by (1) 
directly incorporating communication as a variable affecting trust, 
(2) describing a direct feedback from the level of cooperation to rep-
utation, and (3) describing another direct feedback from ‘net benefit’ 
to the ‘level of cooperation’. The chief point of the figure is altered 
only slightly: levels of communication can affect trust levels, which 
substantially determine levels of cooperation. Positive outcomes of 
cooperation include enhanced reputations for cooperators, which 
can lead to increased trust and reciprocity, and subsequently even 
higher levels of cooperation. 
The goal of communicating and developing a reputation for trust-
worthiness is to build ‘relationship capital’, as it is known in the lit-
erature on international business alliances36, which can alter a game’s 
expected payoffs by raising the subjectively perceived probabilities 
of mutual cooperation. Communication does not inevitably lead to 
higher levels of trust, of course. But simple communication has too 
often been denigrated as ‘cheap talk’35, which, ironically, can prove 
extremely valuable for improving cooperation. 
The hypothesis about communication, trust and cooperation is 
further supported by a substantial body of research. In a variety of 
experimental settings, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker found “com-
munication … to be a very effective mechanism for increasing the 
frequency with which players choose joint income-maximizing 
strategies, even when individual incentives conflict with the cooper-
ative strategies”27. Their experiments confirmed, more generally, “the 
power of face-to-face communication in a repeated common-pool 
Figure 1 | Core relations in repeated social dilemmas. Adapted from 
Ostrom34,35.
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resource dilemma where decisions are made privately”27, particularly 
where costs of communication are low. More recently, a field experi-
ment conducted by Cardenas et al.37 revealed that repeated commu-
nications help to establish the identities of ‘conditional cooperators’ 
in a group, “who can then develop common knowledge that they 
will play the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated game.” Extraction 
rates from common pools fell significantly as a direct consequence of 
the repeated communications.
Although the existing empirical and experimental literatures do 
not provide much insight into relations between the scale or scope of 
communications and cooperative outcomes, especially in the context 
of international negotiations, several discrete studies provide some 
indication that the scale, scope, duration and context of communica-
tions can matter. Aumann and Hart38, for example, show that ‘long 
cheap talk’ (that is, communications over a longer period of time) 
helps to promote cooperation better than ‘short cheap talk’. Barrett25 
suggests that quieter and more confidential conversations might 
be advantageous, observing that the recent trend toward greater 
democracy and transparency in international negotiations has not 
necessarily promoted cooperation. Compromise, he notes, is not so 
easy when it must be done in full public view. Such assessments war-
rant the hypothesis that formal or informal, one-on-one, or small-
group communications might have a significant positive impact on 
climate negotiations.
In a literature review of public good and common-pool resource 
experiments, Ostrom35 explored six potential reasons that commu-
nication increases cooperation. It:
(1) facilitates the development of socially optimal strategies;
(2) allows for exchanges of promises;
(3) “increases mutual trust and thus affects expectations of others’ 
behaviour”;
(4) adds value to payoffs;
(5) reinforces norms; and
(6) promotes development of ‘group identity’.
Ostrom found “building trust… to be a key link in the commu-
nication–cooperation connection”, and that “the efficacy of commu-
nication is related to the capability to talk on a face-to-face basis.”
The US–China Climate Change Working Group
But can increasing the frequency and types of interactions among 
parties increase levels of mutual trust and cooperation in the climate 
change context? Despite more than two decades of formal meetings 
under the auspices of the UNFCCC, most major emitting countries 
including China and the United States have remained (generally 
speaking) non-cooperators on GHG mitigation. In April 2013, how-
ever, those two climate belligerents established a joint US–China 
Climate Change Working Group with the explicit goal of fostering 
cooperation and facilitating bilateral and multilateral negotiations39. 
How many people outside the climate policy community have even 
heard about this group, let alone follow its ongoing negotiations?
The Working Group’s first official report40 enunciated three 
main goals, the second of which relates directly to the thesis of this 
Perspective: “both sides appreciate that advancing concrete action 
on climate change can serve as a pillar of our bilateral relationship, 
build mutual trust and respect, and pave the way for a stronger over-
all collaboration.” In June 2013, the Working Group picked some 
low-hanging fruit by agreeing to a ‘phase-down’ of emissions of 
hydrofluorocarbons — potent GHGs, but not of great importance 
to either the United States or the Chinese economy, especially after 
the European Union prohibited its member states from funding 
hydrofluorocarbon-based Clean Development Mechanism projects 
in China, which had been a major source of fraud4.
No one realistically expected the US–China Climate Change 
Working Group to yield significant climate-policy benefits in a 
matter of a few months or even years. But already the regular 
meetings seem to be paying dividends. On 11 November 2014, US 
President Obama and Chinese President Xi signed a climate-change 
agreement, “worked out quietly” over the course of nine months41. 
Pursuant to that agreement, the United States set a new target of 
reducing its carbon emissions by 26–28% from 2005 levels by 2025, 
and China committed to peak its carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 
(or earlier), while increasing use of non-fossil fuels to 20% of its 
total energy portfolio42. These are, of course, only pledges of future 
reductions; it remains to be seen whether the pledges will be ful-
filled. Future governmental action is especially difficult to guarantee 
in democratic republics such as the United States, where presiden-
tial elections can lead to policy reversals.
An explicit motivating factor for both the United States and 
China was to “galvanize efforts to negotiate a new global agreement 
by 2015”41. At the very least, the agreement puts more pressure on 
other non-cooperating countries, including India and Canada. That 
the world’s two largest emitters of carbon, and two of the existing 
global climate regime’s greatest belligerents, entered into a bilateral 
agreement with the aim of improving global negotiations amounts 
to an implicit endorsement of the polycentric approach to climate 
governance, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the global negoti-
ations. And, interestingly, although the deal was done behind closed 
doors, in complete secrecy, no one seems to be complaining about 
a ‘democracy deficit’.
The US–China climate agreement was not hammered out in the 
course of a couple of days by the two principals. It was worked out 
over many months by their agents, lower-level government officials. 
Unfortunately, trust and cooperation between negotiators does not 
always translate into trust and cooperation among their principals, 
the individuals who sign agreements and ratify treaties. Moving 
trust from the negotiators (that is, agents) to the principals depends 
on processes of ‘intra-organizational bargaining’43. But whatever the 
difficulties of such processes, it remains clear that if trust does not 
first develop between negotiators, its development among the prin-
cipals is unlikely. Principal-agent problems are, at least at some level, 
unavoidable for any proposed solution to a given collective-action 
problem. The key empirical question is whether principal-agent dif-
ficulties are so serious as to undermine any negotiated solutions, 
whether local, national or global.
Private actors in polycentric governance
The polycentric approach is not solely concerned with coopera-
tion between public agents at different levels of government. It is 
about governance, not governments, and encompasses private as 
well as public actors. Those private agents include GHG emitters, 
non-governmental organizations, small groups of concerned citi-
zens, even families who might decide, for example, to install solar 
systems at their homes and take other steps to minimize their car-
bon footprints1. It is easy enough to point to private-sector actors 
that have taken significant actions to reduce GHG emissions. The 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
was founded in 1992, just before the Earth Summit in Rio, by a 
Swiss entrepreneur who “believed that business had an inescapable 
role to play in sustainable development” (http://www.wbcsd.org/
about.aspx). Today, the WBCSD represents the CEOs of more than 
200 companies globally. Its Executive Committee includes CEOs 
from multinational corporations such as Unilever, Toyota, Infosys, 
Royal Dutch Shell and China Petrochemical. Recently, the WBCSD 
partnered with scientists from the Stockholm Resilience Centre 
and policy analysts at the World Resources Institute to establish 
ACTION2020, a programme designed to develop ‘business solu-
tions’ that will ensure global mean temperatures do not increase 
by more than 2 °C by 2050. According to its Action2020 Overview 
(http://go.nature.com/2VmDLt), those solutions will be measurable, 
scalable, replicable, beyond business as usual and, ultimately, good 
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for business. On other matters relating to sustainable development, 
it has partnered with the World Wildlife Fund, the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature, and the Earthwatch Institute, 
among many others.
The WBCSD’s activities should not be dismissed blithely as 
‘greenwash’, but should be understood, as Najam44 has argued, as 
a serious offer from the private sector to participate in finding 
effective solutions to problems such as climate change. At the very 
least, by taking climate science seriously and recognizing a need 
for private-sector cooperation with regulators and non-govern-
mental organizations on climate solutions, the WBCSD makes it 
more difficult for other firms and business associations to deny or 
downplay the climate change problem. In addition, member CEOs 
of the WBCSD who claim to take the climate change problem seri-
ously and promise to participate in solutions implicitly open them-
selves and their firms to public and media criticism, should they 
fail to live up to their promises. Finally, the WBCSD reminds us 
that no matter who imposes what climate change regulations, the 
vast majority of actual GHG emission reductions will ultimately 
come from private actors (at least in countries where most major 
emitting firms are privately owned). Thus, the role of private actors 
in the process, whether it is a comprehensive global treaty-making 
process or some set of polycentric processes, should not be under-
estimated. Improving levels of trust and cooperation among the 
individuals who are decision-makers within private enterprises, 
with both policy advocates and those who establish and implement 
government policy, would be advantageous for climate policy. To 
that end, the WBCSD’s positive interactions with climate scientists 
and various environmental groups provide a useful and replicable 
working model.
Conclusion
If any realistic policy solution (or set of policy solutions) to the 
climate change problem requires the development of higher levels 
of mutual trust among the relatively small number of major emit-
ting parties, then how quickly can that happen? The honest answer 
is probably not quickly enough to avert the need for fairly high 
levels of adaptation and/or geoengineering. Ostrom45 observes that 
mutual trust is “an asset that individuals build over time by engaging 
in mutually beneficial transactions that cannot be consummated in 
an immediate quid pro quo exchange.” Certainly, the evidence of 
more than 20  years of UN climate meetings is that little mutual 
trust has developed so far. Indeed, a review of contemporaneous 
accounts from recent global climate meetings indicates continuing 
high levels of distrust, represented not only by lack of progress on 
mitigation but also by well-publicized conflicts among parties. A 
headline from the meeting in Warsaw (November 2013) makes the 
point well: “Bitter recriminations highlight climate-summit rift”46.
That subglobal negotiations and agreements might not reduce 
GHG emissions rapidly enough to forestall the need for adapta-
tion and/or geoengineering is no reason to maintain an exclusive 
focus on global policies that have failed and global negotiations 
that remain stalled. To the contrary, a polycentric approach to cli-
mate governance might provide the best chance we have of accel-
erating progress toward global climate stabilization by providing 
more frequent and varied opportunities for major emitting parties 
to engage in face-to-face communications in bilateral and multi-
lateral fora, including some outside the intense glare of the public 
spotlight. Those interactions, some of which the UN might even 
facilitate, could inculcate the kind of mutual trust that seems nec-
essary for greater cooperation at the global level. Thus, a broader 
focus on bilateral and smaller-scale multilateral negotiations might 
be not only desirable; it could be a necessary condition for more 
successful negotiations in the global, UN-based process. As Prins 
and Rayner47 have observed, no silver bullet exists to solve the cli-
mate change problem, but a ‘silver buckshot approach’ might work.
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